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KIRTSAENG V. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.,
136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Supap Kirtsaeng
("Kirtsaeng"), a citizen of Thailand, emigrated to the United States
to study mathematics at Cornell University.' Upon finding that
textbooks sold by John Wiley & Sons ("Wiley"), an academic
publishing company, were available in Thailand for a fraction of
the cost compared to those sold in the United States, Kirtsaeng
asked family and friends to purchase the foreign editions from
Thai bookstores and ship them to him.2 He then sold the textbooks
to American students, reimbursed his suppliers for the cost, and
kept a healthy profit. 3  Wiley sued Kirtsaeng for copyright
infringement, claiming that its exclusive right to distribute
textbooks was violated by Kirtsaeng's activities.4 Kirtsaeng
asserted he was the lawful owner of the textbooks, and under the
"first sale" doctrine," Kirtsaeng could "otherwise dispose of [the
textbooks] as he wishes."5 The Supreme Court ultimately decided
in favor of Kirtsaeng, holding that the first-sale doctrine allows the
resale of domestic and foreign-made books, and remanded to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
to determine attorney's fees. 6  Kirtsaeng invoked § 505 of the
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1983 (2016).
2 id.
3id.
4 Id. Wiley also argues that Kirtsaeng's unauthorized importation of
copyrighted books and his later resale is an infringement of section 602's import
prohibition. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1357
(2013). See also 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) ("Importation into the United States,
without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or
phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an
infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under
section 106").
SId. at 1984; 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2008) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of
section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made
under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession
of that copy or phonorecord.") (emphasis added).
6 Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1984. See also Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 1351, 1371 (2013).
49
1
Garcia: Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016)
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2019
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IPLAW [Vol. XXVII:49
Copyright Act, seeking over two million dollars in attorney's fees
from Wiley.7 The district court denied Kirtsaeng's motion, giving
"substantial weight" to the "objective reasonableness" of Wiley's
infringement claim.8 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed, stating that "the district court properly placed
'substantial weight' on the reasonableness of [Wiley's] position." 9
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit's decision by holding that the lower courts misconstrued
the weight of the "objective reasonableness" factor. 10 The future
implications of this holding may be favorable to intellectual
property lawyers and their clients who pursue an "objectively
reasonable" position and refrain from engaging in aggressive
behaviors, filing claims that are frivolous, or committing
misconduct.
II. BACKGROUND
The broad language of § 505 of the Copyright Act of 1976,
which states that the court "may" award costs and reasonable
attorney's fees to the prevailing party, leaves the crucial issue of
fee apportionment open to various interpretations." As a result, a
circuit split existed with regards to how courts should analyze the
several factors involved in determining whether attorney's fees
7 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1984 (2016). Section
505 of the Copyright Act states:
In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion
may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party
other than the United States or an officer thereof. Except as
otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a
reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the
costs.
17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976).
8 Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1984; John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 2013 WL
6722887, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), affd, 605 F. App'x 48 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated
and remanded, 136 S. Ct. at 1989 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 653 F.
App'x 82 (2d Cir. 2016).
9 Id. (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 605 F. App'x 48, 49 (2d Cir.
2015).
1o Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1988.
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1984-85 (2016); 17
U.S.C. § 505 (1976).
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should be awarded to the prevailing party.12  In an attempt to
resolve the issue, the Supreme Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.
held that a district court may not award attorney's fees as a matter
of course or treat prevailing parties differently. 13  Instead, the
Supreme Court held that a district court may consider: (1) the
frivolousness of plaintiffs claim; (2) plaintiffs motivation; (3)
objective reasonableness of plaintiffs claim; and (4) goals of
compensation and deterrence.1 4 The Supreme Court's decision in
Fogerty also allowed lower courts to exercise significant discretion
in future cases based on the "lower courts' evolving experience."
III. KIRTSAENG V. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.
On remand from the Supreme Court, the district court denied
Kirtsaeng's § 505 claim, reasoning that since Fogerty, the Second
Circuit has emphasized the importance of the "objective
reasonableness" factor in determining whether to award attorney's
12 Compare, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 140 F.3d 70, 74 (1st
Cir. 1998) (emphasizing frivolousness and objectively unreasonable factors),
and Budget Cinema, Inc. v. Watertower Assocs., 81 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir.
1996) (awarding attorney's fees and costs because plaintiff s case was "quite
clearly" objectively unreasonable), with Rosciszewski v. Arete Associates, Inc., 1
F.3d 225, 234 (4th Cir. 1993) (applying a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach), and Hogan Systems, Inc. v. Cybresource Int'l, Inc., 158 F.3d 319,
325 (5th Cir. 1998) (prevailing party receives fees as a matter of course).
13 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994). The issue in Fogerty was
whether the dual standard in awarding attorney fees under § 505 was consistent
with the Copyright Act's purpose. Id. at 519. Under the dual standard,
prevailing plaintiffs are generally awarded attorney's fees as a matter of course,
while prevailing defendants must show that the original suit was frivolous or
brought in bad faith. Id. at 520-21. The Supreme Court rejected the dual
standard and held that parties are to be treated alike and attorney's fees should
be awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court's discretion. Id. at
534.
14 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994) (stating the
nonexclusive factors to guide a courts' discretion are frivolousness, motivation,
objective unreasonableness, and the need to advance considerations of
compensation and deterrence)).
1s Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1985 (2016) (referring
to Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 140 (2005) (noting that
Fogerty was not intended to be the end of the matter).
2016] 51
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fees.16 The district court explained that the imposition of a fee
award against a copyright holder with an "objectively reasonable"
argument does not promote the purposes of the Copyright Act. 17
Further, the court reasoned that a court should not award attorney's
fees where the case is novel or "close" because this type of
litigation tends to clarify copyright law.18  The Second Circuit
affirmed, holding that the district court properly placed substantial
weight on the reasonableness of Wiley's position and perceived no
abuse of discretion.1 9 Kirtsaeng appealed, contending, inter alia,
that the district court and the Second Circuit misconstrued Fogerty
in placing substantial weight on the "objective reasonableness"
factor.20 The Supreme Court held that the "objective
reasonableness" factor is only an important factor in assessing fee
shifting, not the controlling one.21
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
In determining attorney's fees pursuant to § 505, the
Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether the "objective
reasonableness" factor should be dispositive, or alternatively,
whether the lawsuit's role in clarifying copyright law merits a fee
award to the prevailing party.22 Ultimately, the issue in the case
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 2013 WL 6722887, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
2013), affd, 605 F. App'x 48 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded, 136 S. Ct.
1979 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 653 F. App'x 82 (citing Matthew
Bender & Co. v. W. Pub'g Co., 240 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2001)).
17 Kirtsaeng, 2013 WL The first copyright act was enacted in 1790 "[tlo
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing the limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8. H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 47,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, at 5660. In Fogerty, the court explained
that "copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public
through access to creative works." Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S.
Ct. 1979, 1986 (2016) (quoting Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 526). The Copyright Act
strikes a balance between two conflicting aims: "encouraging and rewarding
authors' creations while also enabling others to build on that work." Id.
1 Kirtsaeng, 2013 WL 6722887, at *2.
19 Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1984 (2016).20 d
21 Id. at 1988.
22 Id. at 1983.
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was the question of which approach the Court should adopt to
further the objectives of the Copyright Act.2 3
Wiley argued that the Second Circuit's standard for
awarding fees under § 505, by giving substantial weight to the
reasonableness of a losing party's position, will best serve the
24Act's objectives. In turn, Kirtsaeng argued that the Court should
award the prevailing party fees where the lawsuit meaningfully
clarified copyright law and thus advanced the public interest in
creative work.25
The Supreme Court determined that the "objective
reasonableness" approach that Wiley favored best advances the
purpose of the Copyright Act primarily because it encourages
parties with strong legal positions to enforce their rights while also
deterring litigants with weaker positions from proceeding with the
action.2 6 The Court reasoned that a copyright holder whose work
has clearly been infringed has good reason to bring and maintain a
claim, while the infringer will be incentivized to settle for fear of
having to pay double fees.2 7 Conversely, when a copyright holder
has an unreasonable position, she or he has a strong incentive to
refrain from filing suit; and the infringer with no reasonable
affirmative defense has every reason to settle quickly.28 The Court
noted that this result will enhance the probability that both creators
and lawful users will enjoy the substantive rights of the Copyright
Act.29 In contrast, Kirtsaeng's proposed approach would not
necessarily encourage parties to fully litigate claims. 3 0 In fact, the
Court found that fee awards under this standard may discourage
231 Id. at 1985.
24 Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1985.25 Id. at 1987.
261 Id. at 1986.
27 d.
28 id
29 Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1987.
30 Id. The Court noted that fee shifting is a "double edged sword: [it] increase[s]
the reward for a victory - but also enhance[s] the penalty for a defeat." Id.
Indeed, maintaining a lawsuit under this approach will depend on whether the
litigant is risk-averse or a "high roller." Id. See Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal
Studies 399, 438 (1973) (explaining how the English rule, where a prevailing
party. is awarded fees as a matter of course, does not create an incentive to sue
on every meritorious claim).
2016] 53
5
Garcia: Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016)
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2019
DEPAUL J ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXVII:49
meritorious claims because the penalty for losing a case is very
high.3 1
Further, the Court found Wiley's approach more
administrable than Kirtsaeng's because in its determinations the
district court already considers the strength and weaknesses of
each party's claims, and thus determines if the claim or defense is
unreasonable. 32 District courts cannot readily determine whether a
newly decided issue will have precedent-setting value that clarifies
existing law.3 3  Additionally, the Court found that Wiley's
approach is consistent with Fogerty because it treats plaintiffs and
defendants even-handedly. 3 4
By adopting Wiley's approach of giving substantial weight
to the objective reasonableness of the losing party, the Court
rejected the Second Circuit's interpretation of the Fogerty
factors.3 5 The Court of Appeals found that the Second Circuit's
language suggests that a finding of reasonableness raises a
presumption against awarding fees, and district courts have in turn
interpreted the reasonableness of the party to be dispositive.36 The
Court clarified that a court may award fees even when the losing
party was objectively unreasonable in its litigation position, such
31 Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1986-87.
32 Id. at 1987.
Id. at 1987-88. The Court also notes that district courts are not accustomed to
evaluating the broader ramifications of their rulings (at least in degree when
compared to higher courts), and thus, their award determinations would reflect
mere "educated guesses." Id.
34 Id. at 1988. Fogerty held that plaintiffs and defendants should be treated
even-handedly, when determining fee awards, because a successful defense of
copyright infringement as well as a successful prosecution of an infringement
claim by the holder of a copyright may both further the policies of the Copyright
Act. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994).
35 Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1988.
36 Id. at 1989. See also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 2013 WL
6722887, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), affd, 605 F. App'x 48 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated
and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 653 F.
Appen'x 82 (2016) (stating "[b]ecause the principle purpose of the [Copyright
Act] is to encourage the origination of creative works by attaching enforceable
property rights to them[,] ... the imposition of a fee award against a copyright
holder with an objectively reasonable litigation position will generally not
promote the purposes of the Copyright Act") (emphasis in original) (quoting
Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 240 F.3d 116, 121-22 (2d Cir.
2001)).
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as repeated instances of infringement, misconduct, or
overaggressive behavior. 37 Therefore, the Court held that when
assessing fee awards under § 505, the objective reasonableness of
the party is important, but courts must consider on a case-by-case
basis all the relevant circumstances. 3 8
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. demonstrates the
ongoing difficulty the judiciary faces when it grants attorney's fees
based on the court's discretion.39 However, the Court's
affirmation of Fogerty and clarification of the proper weight to
give the "objective reasonableness" factor should give comfort to
intellectual property lawyers and their clients. 40 This is because a
party who engages in reasonable prosecution of a copyright claim,
or conversely engages in a reasonable defense, should not be at
risk of fee shifting as long as th&y do not file frivolous claims,
commit misconduct, or use aggressive litigation tactics. 41  The
Court's holding also acknowledges a fundamental reality of fee
shifting; the prospect of a fee award raises the stakes of litigation,
and those stakes only increase as fees accrue over multiple levels
3 Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1988-89. Although the Court remanded the case, the
Court may have been alluding to Wiley's overaggressive tactics because Wiley
motioned the District Court to attach Kirtsaeng's personal property and to have
Kirtsaeng adjudged in contempt. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 2013
WL 6722887, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
3 8Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1989. In its holding, the Court strikes a balance
between placing "substantial weight" on the objective reasonableness factor and
applying a totality of the circumstances approach.
39 The American rule states that attorney's fees are generally not awarded to the
prevailing party absent a statute or enforceable contract. Fleischmann Distilling
Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). This is in contrast to
the English rule, which since the Statute of Gloucester in 1275, has ordinarily
awarded attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party in litigation. Arthur L.
Goodhart, Costs, 38 Yale L.J. 849, 852 (1929). Proponents of the American
rule state that since litigation is an uncertain endeavor, litigants should not be
penalized for defending their rights, and that the poor may discouraged from
pursuing vindication if their defeat in court will also include the costs of the
opposing party. Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718.
40 Patrick H.J. Hughes, Supreme Court sets attorney fee standard for copyright
cases (U.S.), 2016 WL 3343758.
41 Id.
2016] 55
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of litigation.4 2 Thus, a party who has a meritorious claim may
stand on its rights against an unreasonable party.4 3
The Court's holding also avoids setting detrimental
precedent for litigants by overhauling the Fogerty standard, or
adopting a "loser pays" standard. The Fogerty factors allow courts
to apply a well-reasoned and easily administrable test in awarding
fees to a prevailing party by analyzing: (1) the objective
reasonableness of the losing party's position; (2) its frivolousness;
(3) its motivation and considerations of compensation; and (4)
deterrence. 4 4 The Supreme Court properly reasoned that the other
Fogerty factors may easily outweigh the objective reasonableness
element in situations where the party files a frivolous claim or acts
in bad faith by filing hundreds of lawsuits on an overbroad
theory.4 5 Equitable considerations of compensation and deterrence
also aid courts in determining attorney fees in situations where the
party should be compensated for costs resulting from bad faith
claims or clear misconduct. 4 6 Under the Supreme Court's ruling in
Kirtsaeng, litigants can rely on the Fogerty factors to obtain
attorney's fees.
Kirtsaeng implicitly overrules the Fifth and Sixth Circuits'
presumption that the prevailing party is entitled to fees.4 7 As a
result, these circuits may have to apply the Fogerty factors more
vigorously and add substantial weight to the objective
reasonableness of the losing party's position. Additionally, the
42 Kirtsaeng,136 S. Ct. 1979, 1987.
43 Id. at 1987.
44 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994).
45 Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1989. See also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WB
Music Corp., 520 F.3d 588, 590 (6th Cir. 2008) (awarding fees against a
copyright holder who alleged nearly 500 counts against 800 defendants for
copyright infringement arising from music sampling).
46 Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1988-89.
47 See, e.g., Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, Inc., 789 F.3d 573, 588-89 (5th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 592 (2015) (holding that "an award of attorney's
fees to the prevailing party in a copyright action is the rule rather than the
exception and should be awarded routinely ... Although [the Fogerty] factors
are useful, we have rejected the idea that district courts are bound to apply
verbatim [those] factors") (internal quotations omitted), and Eagle Servs. Corp.
v. H20 Indus. Servs., Inc., 532 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that
"[t]he presumption in a copyright case is that the prevailing party ... receives
an award of fees) (internal quotations omitted).
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Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, generally applying the Fogerty
factors equally, will have to align their review of fee awards with
the standard established in Kirtsaeng.4 8 Therefore, although the
Supreme Court refrained from explicitly overruling any circuit's
precedent, the unanimous holding of the Court has the effect of
setting a national standard for awarding fees in copyright cases.
Having considered the immediate repercussions of the
Supreme Court's decision, one has to wonder, could the Supreme
Court have done more? Although the Supreme Court avoided
overhauling longstanding precedent by reaffirming Fogerty, the
Court should have simplified the process for district courts to
determine fee shifting by assigning equal weight to the Fogerty
factors, as the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have. 4 9 These
circuits employ the most flexible and impartial standard under
§ 505 by engaging in a balancing of the Fogerty factors, assigning
no particular weight to any one factor. These circuits require
lower courts to consider the totality of the circumstances, in an
evenhanded and objective manner, even where the facts in the
particular case merit fee shifting. The totality of the circumstances
approach removes the requirement that the lower courts must give
"substantial weight" to the "objective reasonableness" factor.
Perhaps the Court in Kirtsaeng should have followed the totality of
the circumstances approach as applied by the Third, Fourth, and
Sixth Circuits, which would serve to clarify the process for judges,
while also furthering the objectives of the Copyright Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
Supap Kirtsaeng successfully defended himself against John
Wiley & Sons' copyright infringement lawsuit in the Supreme
Court. On Remand to the Southern District Court of New York,
48 See, e.g., Marshall & Swift/Boeckh, LLC v. Dewberry & Davis LLC, 586 F.
App'x 448, 449 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting a presumption in favor of awarding
fees to prevailing defendants but instead applying equal weight to the Fogerty
factors), andInDyne, Inc. v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 587 F. App'x 552, 554 (1lth
Cir. 2014) (awarding fees to defendant under equal consideration of Fogerty
factors).
49 See Lieb v. Topstone Indus. Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1986), Bond v.
Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 397 (4th Cir. 2003), and Thoroughbred Software Int'l Inc.
v. Dice Corp., 488 F.3d 352, 361 (6th Cir. 2007).
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Kirtsaeng petitioned for an award of more than two million dollars
in fees from Wiley. The district court denied his petition on the
ground that Wiley's position was objectively reasonable. The
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding, whereupon
Kirtsaeng filed certiorari to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court, applying the nonexclusive factors cited in Fogerty,
delivered a victory for Wiley. The Court clarified that when
determining whether to award attorney's fees under § 505 of the
Copyright Act to a prevailing party, courts must consider the
objective reasonableness of the losing party's position as an
important factor among several other relevant factors. Although
Kirtsaeng established a standard for awarding attorney's fees, the
Supreme Court could have added further clarity to § 505 of the
Copyright Act by adopting the totality of the circumstances
approach.
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